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I INTRODUCTION 
It has become commonplace in modern legal practice for lawyers to transfer their 
employment between firms. This creates significant ethical difficulties for the lawyer and 
the lawyer's new firm. It is inherent in the nature of legal practice that, while working for 
a client, a lawyer will obtain confidential information. The risk that exists for the 
transferring lawyer's new firm is that the new lawyer will "taint" other members of the 
firm, causing it to be disqualified from continuing to represent some of its existing clients. 
This new lawyer is a "Typhoid Mary". 
A lawyer who transfers employment to another law flllil may have represented a client 
whose interests are opposed to those of an existing client of the new flllil. 1 In this 
situition, the transfer of employment has implications for the lawyer and the new law firm. 
Depending on the circumstances, both the transferring lawyer and the entire law flllil may 
be disqualified from continuing to act. 
The paper addresses the circumstances m which law firms can prevent their 
disqualification when a Typhoid Mary joins the firm. Parts II and III analyse the positions 
adopted by courts in Canada and the United States. Part IV examines the measures that 
can be adopted to prevent the disqualification of the finn. Both Chinese walls and cones of 
A similar problem occurs where a lawyer (or law firm) has previously represented a client and then 
seeks to represent another client in circumstances where the former client's confidential information 
may be disclosed or such representation will cause damage to the administration of justice. The 
traditional test stated in Rakusen v Ellis Munday & Clarke [1912] 1 Ch D 831 no longer represents 
the law in New Zealand: see Black v Taylor [1993] 3 NZLR 403. The appropriate legal position for 
this analogous problem has been considered elsewhere and will not be dealt with for the purposes of 
this paper. For further analysis of this issue, the reader is referred to MR Dean & CF Finlayson 
"Conflicts of Interest: When may a lawyer act against a former client?" [1990] NZLJ 43; GP Barton , 
CF Finlayson & RA Dobson "Conflicts, Undertakings & Privilege - The Must Knows" (New Zealand 
Law Society Seminar, 1991); JR Midgley "Confidentiality, Conflicts of Interest and Chinese Walls" 
(l 992) 55 MLR 822; L Aitken "Chinese Walls and Conflicts of Interest" ( 1992) l 8 Mon U LR 91. 
CAW lll3RARY 
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silence2 are considered. Part V analyses the approach taken in a recent New Zealand case. 
The policy considerations relevant to deciding the appropriate disqualification rule for 
New Zealand are examined in Part VI. Parts VII and VIII analyse the disqualification 
standard that should be developed in New Zealand and identifies other factors that should 
influence a court in deciding whether to disqualify a firm. 
The thesis of this paper is that the New Zealand courts should disqualify a fum only in 
circumstances where there is legitimate concern for the position of the lawyer's former 
client. This concern usually arises because the transferring lawyer may disclose 
confidential information about the former client to other lawyers in the new firm. A 
properly instituted Chinese wall should be recognised as one factor that the courts can 
draw upon in order to conclude that the former client will not be detrimentally affected by 
the lawyer's movement to another firm. It should not, however, be the sole factor. 
The court must consider two interrelated questions when confronted with an 
application to disqualify a firm who has hired a transferring lawyer:
3 first, whether the 
transferring lawyer is disqualified from continuing to act; secondly, if the lawyer is 
disqualified, whether the entire law firm should be disqualified from continuing to act for 
an existing client whose interests are opposed to those of a client of the lawyer's former 
firm. 
This second question is the focus of this paper. However, the analysis would be 
incomplete if the former question was ignored. The approach of the Canadian Supreme 
Court in resolving both questions is examined below. 
2 Chinese walls and cones of silence are barriers erected by Jaw firms to prevent the now of confidential 
information between lawyers in the same firm. For further explanation, see Part IV. 
RB Batemen "Return to the Ethics Rules as a Standard for Attorney Disqualification: Attempting 
Consistency in Motions For Disqualification by the Use of Chinese Walls" (I 995) 33 DUQLR 249, 
253; JG Koeltl and J Oestericher "Double-Edged Disqualification Motions" (1993) 19 Litigation 38. 
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II THE APPROACH OF THE CANADIAN SUPREME COURT 
The Supreme Court of Canada considered the position of a transferring lawyer and the 
new law firm in the leading case of MacDonald Estate v Martin.
4 The case concerned a 
junior lawyer who possessed confidential information, about a plaintiff engaged in 
litigation. The lawyer subsequently transferred to a law finn who was acting for the 
defendant in the same litigation. The defendant sought an order removing the lawyer's 
new fom as the solicitor of record. A unanimous Supreme Court disqualified the law firm 
from continuing to act. 
A The Majority Approach in MacDonald Estate v Martin 
In determining whether the transferring lawyer and the new law firm should be 
prevented from continuing to represent a client, the majority
5 of the Supreme Court 
recognised that "the movement of lawyers from one firm to another are familiar features of 
the modern practice of law."
6 Sopinka J identified three competing values that had to be 
balanced in deciding the case: 
7 
There is first of all the concern to maintain the high standards of the legal profession and the 
integrity of our system of justice. Furthermore, there is the countervailing value that a litigant 
should not be deprived of his or her choice of counsel without good cause. Finally, there is the 
desirability of permitting reasonable mobility in the legal profession. 
Sopinka J placed the greatest emphasis on the first factor. He considered that the loss 
of public confidence in the confidentiality of information passing between a solicitor and 
4 
6 
(1991) 77 DLR (4th) 249. 
The majority judgment was delivered by Sopinka J and was concurred in by Dickson CJC, La Forest 
and Gonthier JJ. 
Above n 4, 255. 
Above n 4, 254. 
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client would deliver a serious blow to the integrity of the profession and to the 
administration of justice. 
After an extensive review of authority, Sopinka J concluded that a standard which 
prevented not only actual conflicts of interest but also the appearance of conflict was 
required. The test he adopted was whether the reasonably info1med person would be 
satisfied that no use of confidential information would occur. 
Sopinka J proposed a two stage inquiry to decide whether disclosure of confidential 
info1mation would occur. First, the court must determine whether the lawyer received 
confidential information from a former client relevant to the current matter. Where the 
current and former representations are sufficiently related, the court will presume that the 
transferring lawyer possesses confidential information pertaining to the former client. The 
onus of rebutting this inference is a heavy one and falls on the solicitor who faces 
disqualification. Secondly, the court will consider whether the confidential information will 
be misused. Where both tests are satisfied, disqualification of the lawyer is automatic. 
For other lawyers in the transferring lawyer's new firm, the answer to the question of 
whether the confidential information has been misused is less clear. Does the risk that the 
confidential information may be misused by other lawyers in the firm justify 
disqualification of the whole firm? Sopinka J considered that a rule assuming that the 
knowledge of one lawyer is the knowledge of every lawyer in the firm was "unrealistic in 
the era of the mega-firm."
8 However, Sopinka J recognised that there is a strong inference 
that lawyers who work together share each other's confidences. Confidential information 
will be presumed to have been shared within the firm unless the contrary is shown. 
Therefore, the entire firm will be disqualified unless it can show that all reasonable 
measures were taken to ensure that the tainted lawyer did not disclose information to 
Above n 4, 268 . 
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other members of the firm. Sopink:a J thought that Chinese walls could serve this purpose 
only in exceptional circumstances. 
The standard proposed by Sopinka J reflects the paramount importance of preserving 
the integrity of the justice system. This requires the protection of the former client's 
confidential information. However, Sopinka J recognised that the mobility of lawyers and 
allowing clients to choose their representation are important interests which cannot be 
ignored. A rebuttable presumption that confidences have been disclosed to other lawyers 
in the firm strikes an appropriate balance between these interests. 
B The Minority Approach in MacDonald Estate 
The minority9 sought to impose a stricter duty than the majority. Cory J's persuasive 
judgment is underpinned by the rationale that ensuring the appearance of justice is 
fundamental. Although the desirability of a client retaining counsel of choice and the 
mobility of the legal profession are important considerations, they must not detract from 
ensuring the integrity of the justice system. '
0 The essence of the minority's concern 1s 
expressed in the following terms: 
11 
[T]he integrity of the judicial system is of such fundamental importance to our country and, indeed, 
to all free and democratic societies that it must be the predominant consideration in any balancing 
of these three factors. 
Cory J stated that, where a lawyer who possesses confidential information joins a firm 
acting for a client involved in litigation against a former client, there should be an 
9 The minority judgment was delivered by Cory J and was concurred in by Wilson and L'Heureux-Dube 
JJ. 
10 Above n 4, 274. For an analysis of the extent of the difference between the minority and majority on 
this point see HP Glenn "Standard For Disqualification of Law Firm to Act in Litigation: MacDonald 
Estate v Martin." (1991) 70 Can Bar Rev 351, 356-359. 
11 Above n 4, 272. 
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irrebuttable presumption that lawyers who work together share each other's confidences. 
Therefore, knowledge of the confidential matters is imputed to other members of the fom. 
Such a strict test is required to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice. 
The size of the law film, in Cory J' s opinion, should not reduce the standard imposed 
on the law fom. 12 Cory J would not permit "mega-firms" or the lawyers who wish to join 
them dictate the course of legal ethics. Cory J doubted whether Chinese walls could ever 
serve to protect the interests of former clients: 
13 
No matter how carefully the Chinese wall may be constructed, it could be breached without anyone 
but the lawyers involved knowing of that breach .... They do not change the reality that lawyers in 
the same firm meet frequently nor do they reduce the opportunities for the private exchange of 
confidential information. The public would, quite properly, remain sceptical of the efficacy of the 
most sophisticated protective scheme. 
The stricter standard imposed by the minority reflects those judges' view that 
preventing disclosure of confidential information is of paramount importance. This strict 
view was not shared by the majority. 
C The Response to MacDonald Estate in Canada 
The legal profession in Canada responded swiftly to the decision in MacDonald Estate. 
In 1993, a Canadian Bar Association report set out guidelines on the type of screening 
mechanisms required to prevent disqualification of law firms in circumstances similar to 
those in MacDonald Estate. 14 The guidelines concluded that the "use of [Chinese walls is] 
permitted in appropriate circumstances to permit law firms with [MacDonald Estate v 
12 Above n 4, 274. 
13 Above n 4, 273-274. 
14 Canadian Bar Association Task Force Report "Conflict of Interest Disqualification: Martin v Gray 
and Screening Methods" February 1993. MacDonald Estate v Martin is sometimes referred to as 
Martin v Gray. 
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Martin] conflicts to avoid disqualification." The guidelines then set out the steps that 
should be taken to institute these screening mechanisms so that they will be effective. 
In a recent case, a law firm put screening mechanisms in place to prevent its 
disqualification when an associate transferred into the firm. The court relied upon the 
reasoning of the majority in MacDonald Estate and the guidelines of the Canadian Bar 
Association in dismissing the possibility that confidential information would be disclosed. 
The law firm was not disqualified. 
15 
III DEVELOPMENTS IN THE UNITED ST A TES 
As has been seen, the Supreme Court in MacDonald Estate used presumptions to 
decide the issues which they faced. The courts in the United States have also relied on 
presumptions to formulate disqualification rules and to determine in what circumstances it 
is appropriate for the law firm to continue to act. More than in any other jurisdiction, 
United States courts have considered the conceptual underpinnings and practical 
implications of law firm disqualification. The case law in the United States will be analysed 
to determine principles which may inform any decision that a New Zealand court may 
make on law firm disqualification. 
A Disqualification of the Transferring Lawyer 
The first issue is whether the transferring lawyer can personally act for a client of the 
new firm against the interests of his or her former clients. Where the transferring lawyer 
actually possesses or is presumed to possess the confidential information of a client of the 
former firm, the lawyer will be disqualified from acting against the interests of that client. 
15 Watson v Trace Estate (1994) 29 CPC (3d) 180. See also Ford Motor Company of Canada Ltd v 
Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt ( 1995) 131 DLR (4th) 419. These cases indicate that first instance courts in 
Canada are willing to allow Chinese walls to prevent disqualification of law firms. 
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Where a substantial relationship between the work performed by the lawyer for the 
former client and the current matter exists, the court assumes that "during the course of 
the former representation confidences were disclosed to the attorney bearing on the 
subject matter of the [current] representation."
16 The court will disqualify the lawyer from 
acting on the current matter where this test is satisfied. Evidence establishing actual 
disclosure of confidences is not required. Therefore, the client does not have to disclose in 
court the confidences that they wanted to protect. 
Where a substantial relationship is established, the general rule is that the lawyer is 
irrebuttably presumed to possess confidential infmmation.
17 The difficulty with adopting 
an irrebuttable presumption is that it is over-inclusive. A lawyer can be disqualified in 
circumstances where the lawyer can actually prove that he or she had not worked on a 
matter and in fact held no confidential information.
18 
16 TC Theatre Corp v Warner Bras Pictures Inc 113 F Supp 265 (SONY, 1953). 
17 Bateman, above n3, 266. Defining what constitutes a substantial relationship is therefore of critical 
importance because it will, in effect, determine whether the firm is disqualified. The definitions of a 
substantial relationship vary between the different Circuits. However, most Circuits require a 
relationship between factual contexts of the former and the current representation. For a fuller 
discussion, see Comment "Developments in the Law - Conflict of Interest in the Legal Profession" 
(1981) 94 Harv LR 1247, 1323-1333. 
18 Trone v Smith 621 F 2d 994, 998-999 (9th Cir, 1980). The apparent reason for disqualification in 
these circumstances was due to early Circuit courts ' reliance on the American Bar Association Model 
Code of Professional Responsibility when deciding whether to disqualify law firms . Canon 9 of the 
Model Code required avoiding even the "appearance of impropriety". This requirement strongly 
influenced some courts and lead to the development of a very strict disqualification rule for the lawyer 
involved . See, for example, TC Theatre, above n 16, and Emle Industries v Patentex Inc 478 F 2d 
562 (2nd Cir, 1973). Due to other decisions of the courts and the revocation of the Model Code, the 
importance of the appearance of propriety is no longer the central justification for the disqualification 
rule. See further DR McMinn "ABA Formal Opinion 88-356: New Justification for Increased Use of 
Screening Devices to Avert Attorney Disqualification" (1990) 65 NYULR 1231, 1236-1244. 
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Some courts have responded to this difficulty. 
19 These decisions have held that the 
transferring lawyer is rebuttably presumed to possess confidential information. Where the 
lawyer can prove that there was no realistic chance that he or she obtained the confidences 
of the former client, the presumption is rebutted. Such a rule prevents the disqualification 
of a lawyer who had no actual involvement with a client of the former fum or who worked 
only on peripheral matters. The realities of the situation are therefore considered. 
B Disqualification of the Entire Firm 
If the transferring lawyer is disqualified, the former client may seek to extend the 
disqualification to the transferring lawyer's new firm. To determine whether the entire fum 
should be disqualified, courts have used a presumption that the transferring lawyer shares 
confidences with other lawyers in the new firm. Disqualification prevents the new fum 
from misusing confidential information about the transferring lawyer's former client. 
Initially, courts held the presumption of shared confidences to be irrebuttable. Where 
the transferring lawyer was disqualified from acting on certain matters, this disqualification 
automatically spread to the entire fum.
20 The notion that information flows freely between 
lawyers in the office, so that the knowledge of one lawyer is the knowledge of all, 
provides the justification for the disqualification of the firm. The consequence of such a 
strict rule was that disqualification applications were used to disqualify the entire firm even 
19 Silver Chrysler Plymouth Inc v Chrysler Motors Corp 518 F 2d 751 (2nd Cir, 1975); Cheng v GAF 
Corp 631 F 2d l 052 (2nd Circ, 1981 ); Freeman v Chicago Musical Instrument Co 689 F 2d 715 (2nd 
Cir, 1982). For a comprehensive discussion of the leading case of Silver Chyrsler see HM Liebman 
"The Changing Law of Disqualification: The Role of Presumption and Policy" (1979) 72 NULR 996. 
20 There are two reasons that some courts in the Seventh Circuit have used to justify the irrebuttable 
presumption. First, it avoids the necessity of having to disclose the actual confidential in formation in 
open court. Secondly, an irrebuttable presumption is required by the spiri t of Canon 9 of the Model 
Rules to avoid even the appearance of impropriety. See generally the Seventh Circuit decision in Novo 
Terapeutisk Laboratorium v Baxter Travenol Lab Inc 607 F 2d 186 (7th Cir, 1979). 
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where no confidential information had been passed by the disqualified lawyer to other 
members of the firm. 
The recent trend is for courts to rebuttably presume that confidences have been 
disclosed. A rebuttable presumption protects the interests of the former client while not 
unnecessarily inhibiting clients' ability to choose which law firm represents them or 
restricting the growing mobility of lawyers. No undue hardship is caused to the law firm or 
to an existing client of the firm. Therefore, in relaxing the strict rule, the courts are seeking 
to fairly balance the interests of current and former clients to reach a just and sensible 
result.21 The law firm should be disqualified only where protection of the former client's 
interests is legitimately required. 
The rationale for preferring a rebuttable presumption was persuasively stated m 
Analytica Inc v NPD Research Inc:
22 
If prior representation of a particular client will irrebuttably disqualify an entire firm from handling 
certain cases the result could easily be whole law Finns of "Typhoid Marys." This would have a 
drastic impact on the careers of attorneys in entire Finns, would impede the clients' rights to be 
represented by attorneys of choice and would discourage attorneys with expertise in a particular 
field of law from handling cases in their respective specialties. 
The court recognised that to hold fast to an irrebuttable presumption was unnecessarily 
inflexible and ignored the reality of a modern law firm's operation. The leading case of 
Schiessle v Stephens23 applied these principles to the transfer of a lawyer between two 
21 See Novo Terapeutisk Laboratorium v Baxter Travenol Lab Inc, above n20. 
22 708 F 2d 1263, 1277 (7th Cir, 1983). 
23 717 F 2d 417 (7th Cir, 1983). This was the first case where a rebuttable presumption was adopted for 
lawyers transferring between private films. All the previous cases concerned ex-government lawyers 
transferring into private practice. The use of the rebuttable presumption was justified on the basis that 
because these lawyers could not readily enter private practice, the Government would be deprived of 
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private firms. Although the law firm was disqualified, the court applied a rebuttable 
presumption that confidences had been shared. The lead taken by the Seventh Circuit in 
Schiessle v Stephens has generally been followed in the other Circuits.
24 The noteworthy 
exception is the Tenth Circuit.
25 
Where the court adopts a rebuttable presumption, the issue becomes what is required 
to successfully rebut the presumption. The presumption is rebutted if the new law firm can 
conclusively show that other lawyers did not receive confidential information from the 
transferring lawyer. 
Precisely what is required to show that other lawyers in the firm did not receive 
confidential information is unclear. The method most commonly adopted by law firms to 
rebut the presumption that confidential information is shared is by establishing a Chinese 
wall or cone of silence as soon as the conflict of interest arises.
26 However, Panduit Corp 
capable lawyers . The extension of the rebuttable presumption in Schiessle was controversial and is 
still not universally accepted. 
24 Cheng v GAF Corp, above nl9; Nemours Foundation v Gilbane Aetna Federal Ins Co 632 F Supp 
418 (D Del , 1986); Manning v Waring Cox James Sklar & Allen 849 F 2d 222 (6th Cir 1988); Cox v 
American Cast Iron Pipe Co 847 F 2d 725 ( 11 th Cir, 1988); EZ Paintr Corp v Padco Inc 746 F 2d 
1459 (Fed Cir, 1984). 
25 Graham v Wyeth Laboratories 906 F 2d 1419 (10th Cir, 1990); SLC Ltd v Bradford Group West Inc 
999 F 2d 464 (10th Cir, 1993). These cases expressly reject the approach adopted in the Seventh 
Circuit to deal with disqualification applications faced by firms who hired a new lawyer who hold 
confidential information on a substantially related matter. Both cases reject as unrealistic the 
presumption that all members of a firm have access to all information held within the firm. Without 
the presumption of shared confidences, the court would have to find as a fact that the firm had actual 
knowledge of the information known by the (tainted) transferring lawyer. These decisions represent a 
significant increase in the difficulty that a former client will face in vicariously disqualifying a law 
firm . See the criticism of both decisions in M Madden "Where Does the Tenth Circuit Stand on Rules 
Concerning Conflict of Interest and Disqualification Rules?" (1994) J Contemp L 479. 
26 See Part IV. 
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v All States Plastic Manufacturing Co
27 demonstrates that the presumption can be 
rebutted even though the law firm had instituted no formal screening procedures. On the 
basis of the transferring lawyer's testimonial evidence, the court was satisfied that no 
confidential information had passed or was likely to pass. The court observed that 
screening mechanisms were only one way in which the presumption of shared confidences 
can be overcome.28 Part IV considers the efficacy of Chinese walls and cones of silence to 
prevent disqualification of law firms. 
C A Limitation on the Presumption of Shared Confidences 
As Part III.A demonstrates, a transferring lawyer will be presumed to possess 
confidential information where the litigated matters are substantially related. The courts 
have been willing to use the presumption of shared confidences to disqualify the firm only 
where the transferring lawyer has actual as opposed to presumptive knowledge of a 
former firm's client's affairs.
29 It is unlikely that the law film will be disqualified on the 
basis that the transferring lawyer possesses presumptive knowledge.
30 
The justification for this limitation is to preserve the mobility of lawyers. If the 
limitation did not exist, the mere fact that a lawyer had been employed in one film would 
mean that he or she would presumptively hold a significant amount of confidential 
information about that firm's clients. These lawyers would find it virtually impossible to 
change employment without the risk of disqualifying their new firms from representing 
certain clients. 
27 744 F 2d 1564 (Fed Cir, 1984). 
28 Above n 27, 1580. For a contrary view see M Brodeur "Building Chinese walls: Current 
Implementation and a Proposal for Reforming Law Firm Disqualification" (1988) 7 Rev Litig 167, 
177. 
29 See Arkansas v Dean Food Products Co 605 F 2d 380, 386 (8 th Cir , 1979); American Can Co v 
Citrus Feed Co 436 F 2d 1125, 1129 (5th Cir, 1971 ); Cox v American Cast Iron Pipe Co, above n24. 
30 McMinn, above n 18, 1254. 
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IV DEFENCES FOR LAW FIRMS: CHINESE WALLS AND CONES OF SILENCE 
Implementing Chinese walls and cones of silence are measures which law firms can take 
to prevent the flow of confidential information between lawyers in a film. If successful, 
they prevent the confidential information known by one lawyer being imputed to other 
lawyers in the same firm. Courts in the United States have approved using both 
mechanisms on numerous occasions. The developments in the United States may therefore 
be relevant to New Zealand. 
A Chinese Walls 
Chinese walls are the most common mechanism relied upon to defeat any potential 
disqualification application. A Chinese wall is a set of procedural and physical barriers that 
prevent the flow of information between lawyers in the same firm. 
The large majority of courts in the United States have in principle approved the use of 
Chinese walls to prevent knowledge being imputed to all lawyers in a firm.
31 The landmark 
case of Kesselhaut v United States
32 first approved the use of Chinese walls to prevent 
"vicarious" disqualification.
33 The court held that the law firm should be entitled to rely on 
screening procedures that ensured the transferring lawyer did not disclose confidences to 
other members of the firm and thereby disqualify the firm. Such measures prevent the 
lawyer becoming a "Typhoid Mary", a lawyer whom firms decline to hire because of the 
31 The United States Supreme Court has ruled that appeals from disqualification applications which 
have granted or denied disqualification of the law firm are interlocutory matters which cannot be 
appealed to the federal appellate courts. This decision inhibits the federal courts' ability to re-evaluate 
the status of Chinese walls: Richardson-Merrell Inc v Koller 472 US 424 ( I 985) . 
32 555 F 2d 791 (Ct Cl, 1977). 
33 The term vicarious disqualification is used to describe the disqualification of an entire firm caused by 
a transferring lawyer. Synonyms for this term include imputed disqualification, entity disqualification 
and firm-wide disqualification. 
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risk that other lawyers in the firm will be tainted with the confidences of that lawyer's 
former client. 
In recent years, most courts in the United States have accepted that a correctly 
instituted Chinese wall will be sufficient to rebut the presumption of shared confidences.
34 
Although Chinese walls have generally been accepted in principle, in practice they have 
not achieved widespread recognition as being effective in preventing law firm's being 
disqualified. This is because of defects in their implementation. To be successful, a Chinese 
wall must be correctly instituted. Broadly speaking, a Chinese wall must consist of specific 
institutional mechanisms which prevent the disclosure of confidential information and be 
implemented in a timely manner. 
I The components of the Chinese wall 
The success or otherwise of any screening mechanism will depend on how well the 
court perceives the measures adopted by the firm prevent the flow of confidential 
information. To be effective, the Chinese wall must consist of "specific institutional 
mechanisms" that are sufficient to isolate the transferring lawyer.
35 The nature and extent 
of the procedures that the law firm must implement to prevent disqualification depends on 
the circumstances that surround the particular case. 
The court in Schiessle identified five factors that courts consider in determining the 
effectiveness of a Chinese wall:
36 
34 Armstrong v McAlpin 625 F 2d 433 (2nd Cir, 1980); LaSalle National Bank v County of Lake 703 F 
2d 252 (7th Cir, 1983); Freeman v Chicago Musical Instrument Co, above n 19; Schiessle v Stephens, 
above n 23; Manning v Waring Cox James Sklar & Allen, above n 24. 
35 Above n 23,421. 
36 Above n 23, 421. These factors have been adopted and applied by other courts. See, for example, 
Manning v Waring Cox James Sklar & Allen, above n 24. 
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Factors appropriate for consideration by the trial court might include, but are not limited to, the 
size and structural divisions of the law firm involved, the likelihood of contact between the 
"infected attorney" and the specific attorneys responsible for the present representation, the 
existence of rules which prevent the " infected" attorney from access to relevant files or other 
information pertaining to the present litigation or which prevent him from sharing in the fees 
derived from such litigation. 
17 
It is difficult to determine which factors will always be required and which will not. 
Courts in the United States generally require substantial restrictions on the availability of 
confidential information before they approve the particular Chinese wall they are 
assessing. For example, a firm that successfully prevented disqualification took measures 
which included physically removing all relevant case files to central storage and allowing 
only the lead counsel access; a firm-wide policy that nobody was to talk to the new lawyer 
about the case, any breach of which resulted in dismissal; and instructions to both legal 
and support staff not to leave any part of the relevant files unattended.
37 
The overarching principle is that the law film must effectively isolate the transferring 
lawyer and take all reasonable measures to prevent him or her from disseminating 
confidential information to other lawyers in the firm.
38 More than this, however, the Jaw 
firm must ensure that all staff strictly adhere to those procedures. In one case, the court 
saw fit to impose a Chinese wall itself, setting out the requirements for compliance and the 
sanctions if these procedures were not followed.
39 The court felt sure that these measures 
would prevent both intentional and inadvertent breaches of client confidences. 
37 Petroleum Wholesale Inc v Marshall 751 S W 2d 295 (Tex Ct App, 1988). These measures are 
somewhat similar to those employed in Kesselhaut v United States. 
38 FW Hamermesh "In Defence of a Double Standard in the Rules of Ethics: A Critical Reevaluation of 
the Chinese Wall and Vicarious Disqualification." (1986) 20 U Mich JL Ref 245, 266. Refer also to 
the cases cited in McMinn, above n 18, 1259. 
39 NFC Inc v General Nutrition Inc 562 F Supp 332 (D Mass, 1983). 
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2 The timeliness of the Chinese wall 
The Chinese wall must be implemented before or immediately after the transferring 
lawyer joins the firm or immediately upon the firm becoming aware of the problem. The 
Chinese wall will not achieve its intended purpose if the lawyers involved have deliberately 
or inadvertently disclosed confidences prior to its inception. 
In some circumstances the courts have disqualified law firms simply because a 
proposed Chinese wall was not implemented with sufficient speed. In LaSalle National 
Bank v County of Lake,
40 the court considered whether the disqualification of one 
transferring lawyer required disqualifying the entire firm from continuing to act for its 
client. Judge Cudhay disqualified the entire firm because the otherwise effective Chinese 
wall had not been implemented in a timely manner. The screening arrangement must be in 
place either when the lawyer first joined the fum or when the case presenting the ethical 
problem was accepted.
41 Establishing the Chinese wall in response to a disqualification 
application will therefore not suffice to prevent the law firm from being disqualified. 
B Cones of Silence 
A cone of silence is when the lawyer concerned internalises the confidential information 
and undertakes not to disclose any information pertaining to the former client. They differ 
from Chinese walls because the individual lawyer undertakes to protect the confidential 
information of his or her fo1mer client. 
Cones of silence are less frequently relied on by law firms to prevent vicarious 
disqualifications. However, they have been accepted by some courts. In Neamours 
Foundation v Gilbane Aetna Federal Ins
42 the transferring lawyer's new firm acted 
40 Above n 34. 
41 Above n 34, 259 . 
42 Above n 24. 
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against the interests of his former client. To prevent disqualification of the firm, the lawyer 
was immediately enclosed in a cone of silence.
43 He resolved not to disclose anything 
relating to communications, documents or information to which he had had access. When 
the lawyer changed firms he did not retain any documents from which to refresh his 
memory. The court was also influenced by the fact that most of the information to which 
the lawyer had had access at his former firm was non-confidential and that he was not the 
lead counsel. These factors helped to persuade the court that his former client's 
confidences would remain inviolate. The cone of silence was therefore effective to prevent 
the disclosure of confidences and the disqualification of the firm. 
On a broader level, the court acknowledged that the mobility of lawyers would be 
severely restricted if the use of cones of silence was rejected out of hand.
44 This is a 
logical extension of the argument used to justify Chinese walls. 
V THE APPROACH ADOPTED IN NEW ZEALAND 
Whether a lawyer and the new law firm will be disqualified when the lawyer changes 
firm has only been considered once by a New Zealand court. In Equiticorp Holding Ltd v 
Hawkins,45 three partners in a law fom wished to transfer to a new firm. A client of the 
new law firm was involved in litigation against a client of the partners' former firm. One of 
the transferring lawyers had been directly involved with the litigation and possessed 
confidential information. That lawyer's former client sought to disqualify the new law firm 
from representing its existing client. 
43 The speed and deliberateness in establishing the cone of silence was an important fac tor in not 
disqualifying the firm in Nemours. On this point, see further Lemaire v Texaco In c 496 F Supp 1308 
(E D Tex, 1980). 
44 Above n 24, 430 . 
45 [1993) 2 NZLR 737 . 
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Henry J held that the protection the law affords confidential information passing 
between a solicitor and client must be maintained. Solicitors must avoid actual or potential 
conflicts of interest. The court must determine whether there is a reasonable possibility 
that the fonner client's confidences will be disclosed to the lawyer's new law firm. If this 
requirement is satisfied, the court must assess whether the risk of such disclosure is 
outweighed by a litigant's right to be represented by a solicitor of choice and by the 
desirability of preserving the reasonable mobility of lawyers. The particular factual 
situation must be ascertained and a final judgment made as to whether the overall public 
interest requires disqualification of the law film. Henry J therefore rejected the approach 
adopted in MacDonald Estate when he said:
46 
I have reservations as to the desirability of introducing Court prescribed presumptions, whether 
they be rebuttable or irrebuttable, to the stated situations. I prefer an approach which is directed to 
applying the facts to general principle so as to ensure the aim of protection is fairly met in the 
particular circumstances . 
Applying this test, Henry J held that he would disqualify the law firrn from continuing 
to represent its client if the tainted lawyer joined the firm. No "safeguards against 
inadvertent disclosure" of confidential information had been put in place by the firm. 
Although the risk of such disclosure was small, it was not outweighed by the client's 
desire to retain the firm or by the lawyer's need to obtain a new position. The court 
considered the later factor to be of particular concern but held that it must "yield to the 
greater public interest in maintaining the integrity of the principle of protection ."
47 
Henry J drew heavily on the policy considerations identified by Sopinka J in 
MacDonald Estate to determine where the overall public interest lay. Although the 
decisions differ on whether the use of presumptions is appropriate, both courts emphasised 
46 Above n 45, 740. 
47 Above n 45, 741. 
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the importance of protecting the former client's confidential information. A law firm will 
be disqualified where the possibility of disclosing confidential information exists. 
Part VI elaborates on the policy considerations identified by the courts as being 
important in considering any application for disqualification. Part VII goes on to analyse 
how these considerations will apply in a New Zealand context, to determine whether the 
departure from the approach in MacDonald Estate is justified. 
VI THE POLICY CONSIDERATIONS APPLICABLE IN NEW ZEALAND 
Whether a lawyer can change firm and not disqualify his or her new firm from 
representing current clients depends on how the court reconciles the policy considerations 
identified below. The court must determine how much weight should be attached to each 
consideration. 
A The Integrity of the Justice System and the Appearance of Justice 
Maintaining the high standards of the legal profession and the integrity of the justice 
system were dominant considerations in MacDonald Estate. The integrity of the justice 
system will be maintained if confidential information is not disclosed, and not perceived to 
be disclosed. Where a transferring lawyer causes the perception that confidential 
information may be disclosed, disqualification of the firm is justified to preserve the 
integrity of the justice system. This ensures the public's confidence in the due 
administration of justice is maintained. 
Canadian courts have followed MacDonald Estate and stressed the importance of 
preserving former client's confidential information.
48 However, the majority of the 
Supreme Court acknowledged that the integrity of the justice system and ensuring the 
48 G v International Christian Mission (1995) 125 DLR (4th) 712; Gouveia v Fejko ( 1992) 18 CPR (3d) 
12; Chippewas of Kettle & Stoney Point v Canada ( 1993) 17 CPC (3d) 5. 
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appearance of justice were not the only considerations m determining whether to 
disqualify a law firm.
49 
Similar concerns have influenced courts in the United States. Preserving the 
confidences of former clients is of primary concern.
50 While the courts emphasise the 
importance of "maintaining the highest standards of professional conduct and the 
scrupulous administration of justice" they recognise that other factors must be considered 
in defining the ambit of law firm disqualification.
51 
Substantial weight is accorded to ensuring the integrity of the justice system in New 
Zealand. Black v Taylor concerned a barrister who proposed to act against a former 
client's interests. Richardson J held that disqualification was appropriate where the 
integrity of the juilicial process would be impaired if the lawyer continued to act. The 
overarching principle is that disqualification is required where a lawyer has an actual or 
apparent conflict of interest.
52 The Court of Appeal expressly relied on MacDonald Estate 
to establish the importance of the appearance of justice as a touchstone for 
disqualification. 5
3 
49 The minority of the court held that the integrity of the justice system was the fundamental concern in 
determining whether to disqualify a law frm. Other considerations must not be allowed to detract from 
its importance. See Part II. 
50 See McMinn, above n 18, 1241. 
5 1 KL Penegar "The Loss of Innocence: A Brief History of Law Firm Disqualification in the Courts 
( 1995) 8 Geo J Legal Ethics 831, 863-864 
52 Black v Taylor, above n l, 418 . See also Merck Sharpe and Dahme (New Zealand Ltd) v 
Pharmaceutical Management Agency Ltd (unreported, 7/6/96, High Court, Wellington Registry , 
Gallen J, CP 23/96). 
53 Although Black v Taylor is distingui shable from MacDonald Estate and from the situation being 
considered, this point is of general application and is an important indication of the likely approach of 
the Court of Appeal. See below n 74. 
Typhoid Marys: The Plight of the Modern Law Firm 23 
Ensuring the protection of confidential information and the integrity of the justice 
system are not the only considerations influencing the success of a disqualification 
application. Should their obvious importance be outweighed by other factors when a 
lawyer transfers between firms in New Zealand? 
B Litigants Not Being Deprived of their Choice of Counsel 
When a law film is disqualified from representing the interests of a client because a 
member of the firm has represented an adverse interest of the current client on a related 
matter, the client is effectively deprived of the right to be represented by the law firm that 
they choose. 
In the United States, the Seventh Circuit has acknowledged the delicate balance 
between "the sacrosanct privacy of the attorney-client relationship (and the professional 
integrity implicated by that relationship) and the prerogative of a party to proceed with 
counsel of its choice."
54 The two interests can be reconciled. Where the possibility that 
confidential information will be disclosed is remote, there is no objection in policy terms to 
the court allowing the client to retain their first choice of counsel. The courts are 
suspicious of disqualification applications whose apparent purpose is to deprive a client of 
her lawyer. For example, the court in Manning said:
55 
Unquestionably, the ability to deny one's opponent the services of capable counsel is a potent 
weapon. Confronted with such a motion, courts must be sensitive to the competing public policy 
interests of preserving client confidences and of permitting a party to retain counsel of his choice. 
The courts will not look favourably upon a disqualification application being used to 
prevent an opposing party from retaining a particular firm to represent them in litigation. 
There is no benefit to the administration of justice where a litigant can improve their 
54 Schiessle v Stephens, above n 23, 420. 
55 Above n 24, 224. 
LAN LloR!,HY 
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position by depriving an opponent of competent counsel. Hamermesh states the commonly 
used justification for this view:
56 
[T]he [disqualification] rule should not be permitted to interfere needlessly with the right of 
litigants to obtain competent counsel of their choosing, particularly in speciali sed areas requiring 
special technical training and experience. 
The courts have recognised that law firms should be disqualified only where absolutely 
necessary, in order not to unduly deprive clients of their representation.
57 This is becau e 
disqualification of law finns has serious consequences. A new Jaw firm must be found, 
instructed and briefed. In many circumstances the disqualification order will not permit the 
work product of the first fum to be shared with the newly retained law firm.
58 It will 
involve significant expense and unnecessary duplication of work to bring the new firm up 
to speed.59 
However, the problem is more serious than this. Where the disqualification application 
is granted close to when the litigation is scheduled to start, it may prove impossible for 
lawyers in the new firm to gain a complete understanding of the factual and legal issues 
that are involved in a complex case.
60 An influential note in the Yale Law Journal observed 
that an over-inclusive application of firm-wide disqualification rules will unnecessarily 
restrict other parties from access to the legal talent most familiar with the facts of their 
case.61 Peterson has argued that the effects of this are two fold. There is the psychological 
56 Hamermesh, above n 38, 274. 
57 See Freeman v Chicago Musical Instrument Co, above n 19, 722. In New Zealand, the right of clients 
to choose their representation is not unfettered. See Gazley v Attorney-General ( 1995) 8 PRNZ 313; 
Gazley v Attorney-General (unreported, 16/7/96, Court of Appeal, CA 52/941). 
58 For example, EZ Paintr Corp v Padco Inc, above n 24. 
59 McMinn, above n 18, 1249- 1250; David Lee & Co v Coward Chance [ 1990] 3 WLR 1278, 1285-1286 
60 See the dissenting judgment of Judge Coffey in Analytica In c v NPD Research Inc, above n 22. 
61 Note "Disqualification of Attorneys for Representing Interests Adverse to Former Clients" ( 1955) 64 
Yale LJ 917, 928. 
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hardship, because the client must obtain new counsel with whom the client has not worked 
before and the financial hardship, being the fees that the client incurs in reinstructing 
counsel.62 
Where the fum is advising in a highly specialised area, disqualification of the fmn 
deprives the client of the specialised skill, expertise and experience that the law firm may 
possess or has accumulated over time.
63 These factors are likely to be why the client 
retained the law firm in the first place. 
C The Mobility of the Legal Profession 
Preserving the mobility of lawyers was of concern to the court in both MacDonald 
Estate and Equiticorp Holdings. Both courts weighed the effect of the law fmn being 
disqualified against the importance of protecting confidential information. In Equiticorp 
Holdings, Henry J expressed concern that his decision effectively impeded the ability of 
the lawyer possessing the confidential information to obtain a new position, but held that 
this concern must yield to ensuring the protection of confidential information. 
Where a transferring lawyer may cause the Jaw fum to be disqualified from continuing 
to work for an existing client, that lawyer will face difficulty in transferring between law 
firms. Law firms may not be prepared to risk the possibility that they will be disqualified 
from representing an existing client, simply to hire a single lawyer. Preserving the mobility 
of lawyers requires that law firms must be afforded the opportunity to prevent 
disqualification of the fmn when a lawyer holding relevant confidential information joins 
the firm. 
62 CA Peterson "Rebuttable Presumptions and Intra Firm Screening: the New Seventh Circuit Approach 
to Vicarious Disqualification of Litigation Counsel " ( 1984) 59 Notre Dame L Rev 399, 400-40 I . 
63 See Government of India v Cooks Industries 569 F 2d 737 (2nd Cir, 1978). 
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The importance of the mobility of lawyers has also been recognised m the United 
States:64 
[T]o extend the attorney's disability [ie his disqualification] to all attorneys in any firm he 
joins ... may increase the security of former clients , but it devastates the attorney 's future 
employment prospects. In such situations permitting Chinese wall rebuttal of the presumption of 
shared knowledge can save the attorney from becoming a professional pariah. 
Inter-firm transfer of lawyers has become a significant feature of modern legal practice. 
Many courts have shown an awareness of this change in the legal profession by 
considering the impact that vicarious disqualification has on the mobility of lawyers. 
Adopting a disqualification rule that is too strict has the potential to seriously curtail the 
careers of lawyers simply because of a temporary association with a large law firm. 
This difficulty becomes even more acute when the lawyer practises in a specialised area 
of law. It would be difficult for such a lawyer to transfer to a firm that practises in the 
same specialised area as that lawyer's previous firm and competes for a relatively small 
number of potential clients.
65 This is because of the high probability that the new law fom 
will act for the opponents of the transferring lawyer's former client. This consequence may 
prevent a lawyer from developing a specialised skill that would otherwise be highly sought 
after. 
The argument that lawyers' mobility must be preserved when considering the 
disqualification of the entire firm is of obvious importance. 
64 Comment, above n 17, 1366. 
65 Above n 51 , 865 . 
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D Disqualification Applications Being Used for Improper Purposes 
Applications for disqualification are increasingly being used for tactical purposes during 
protracted litigation proceedings.
66 The purpose of such a motion can be to escalate costs, 
to cause inconvenience and delay,
67 or to remove a particularly competent opposing 
counsel.68 Used in such a manner, successful disqualification applications serve to create 
an injustice rather than to prevent one. As one court stated:
69 
[J]udges must exercise caution not to paint with a broad brush under the misguided belief that 
corning down on the side of disqualification raises the standard of legal ethics and the public's 
respect. The opposite effects are just as likely - encouragement of vexatious tactics and increased 
cynicism by the public. 
The frequency with which disqualification applications are brought is of real concern to 
the courts. One judge recently described such applications as being a "common feature of 
major litigation."70 Disqualification applications that are used for improper tactical· 
purposes are an abuse of process to which the court must remain alert.
71 Courts should 
not disqualify finns without good reason. It is only appropriate where the protection of a 
former client's confidential information is legitimately required. 
If law firms are regularly disqualified in circumstances where such action 1s not 
warranted, there is a danger that a disqualification industry, similar to that in the United 
66 See LA Winslow "Federal Courts and Attorney Disqualification Motions: A realistic approach to 
conflicts of interest" (1987) 62 Wash LR 683, 683. 
67 Bottaro v Hatton Association 680 F 2d 892 (2nd Cir, l 982). 
68 Dalrymple v National Bank & Trust Co 615 F Supp 979, 985 (W D Mich, l 985). The court noted 
that it must "be sensitive to tactical considerations which may impel a party to seek disqualification of 
a particularly competent or formidable opponent." 
69 Above n 27, 1576-1577. 
70 Manville Canada Inc v Ladner Downs ( l 992) 88 DLR (4th) 208, 224. This decision was approved on 
appeal: ( l 993) l 00 DLR ( 4th) 321, 33 I. 
71 BlackvTaylor,aboven 1,420. 
Typhoid Marys: The Plight of the Modern Law Firm 28 
States, could develop.
72 To prevent such a development, the courts could impose 
appropriate sanctions against the party seeking disqualification where there was no 
realistic chance of the application succeeding. The sanctions could range from an adverse 
award of costs to a contempt of court order, depending on the seriousness of the abuse of 
process. Such measures will ensure that disqualification applications remain a shield and 
do not become a sword. 
VII AN APPROPRIATE APPROACH FOR NEW ZEALAND 
The circumstances in which the disqualification of a transferring lawyer should extend 
to the entire firm are unclear. Two questions must be addressed. First, what is the 
appropriate balance of the policy factors identified in Part VI to develop a realistic 
disqualification rule which will not cause an injustice. Secondly, how much regard , if any, 
should be accorded to Chinese walls and cones of silence that are implemented to prevent 
disqualification of the entire firm. Each question shall be addressed in tum. 
A The Appropriate Disqualification Standard 
The preceding analysis of the possible approaches suggests that three alternatives are 
available where the law firm seeks to act against the interests of the transferring lawyer' s 
former client on a related matter. These alternatives all assume that the transferring lawyer 
is disqualified and cannot personally act: 
(i) irrebuttably presummg that confidential information has been disclosed and 
disqualifying the law firm; 
(ii) rebuttably presuming that confidential information has been disclosed and 
allowing the law firm to prove that there is no possibility of disclosure; 
72 PD Finn "Conflicts of Interest and Professionals" (Legal Research Foundation, University of 
Auckland , 1987) 21 . 
Typhoid Marys: The Plight of the Modern Law Firm 29 
(iii) an approach which has as its objective the protection of information, yet 
requires the court to consider the surrounding circumstances to achieve a just 
result. 
The nature of the legal environment in New Zealand is a critical factor in choosing 
between these alternatives. New Zealand is different from Canada and the United States 
because there is a significantly smaller number of law finns. This necessarily means that a 
large proportion of New Zealand's legal talent is within a small handful of law firms. The 
significance of unnecessarily restricting clients' choice of counsel is greater when there are 
fewer prospective law firms to choose from. Similarly, lawyers' ability to transfer firms 
will be severely restricted because there may be only a very small number of law firms who 
can hire an experienced lawyer without facing at least one conflict of interest. 
The severity of these consequences may further encourage litigants to use 
disqualification applications for tactical purposes, despite judicial warnings to the contrary. 
For these reasons, the consequences which flow from the disqualification of any one law 
firm could impact harshly on that firm, the transferring lawyer and the existing clients of 
the new law firm. Therefore, while recognising that the former client's interests require 
protection, a disqualification rule which allows the trial judge flexibility to determine a 
result which is just and fair to all parties must be adopted. 
A rule that irrebuttably presumes that the knowledge of one lawyer in the firm is shared 
with other lawyers will result in the automatic disqualification of the law firm where the 
litigated matters are sufficiently related. While such a rule ensures maximum protection of 
former clients' confidential information, it deprives the court of the flexibility to take into 
account other relevant considerations. Two important considerations in New Zealand are 
preserving lawyers' ability to transfer firms and clients' ability to choose which firms 
represent them. Even where disqualification would severely and unjustifiably cause 
detriment to a party other than the party moving the disqualification application, the court 
would be required to disqualify the firm. There would be no flexibility to take into account 
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other circumstances once it is established that the litigated matters are sufficiently related. 
It is counter-intuitive to disqualify a law fum when there is no realistic chance that 
confidences have been disclosed.
73 The confidential information of former clients can be 
adequately protected without adopting such a harsh and unforgiving standard. An 
irrebuttable presumption of shared confidences is inappropriate in New Zealand. 
The second alternative requires adopting a rebuttable presumption that confidences 
have been shared between lawyers in the same firm. The court will not disqualify the law 
firm where appropriate measures to protect the former client's confidential information 
have been taken . These measures may include, but are not limited to, Chinese walls. This 
is essentially the position adopted by the majority in MacDonald Estate. 
By providing the law firm the opportunity to rebut the presumption, this standard 
mitigates the injustice caused by a stricter standard. The effect of the disqualification on 
the law firm, its lawyers and its clients is considered. These parties have the opportunity to 
put in place measures which would prevent the flow of confidential information. Where no 
confidential information has passed, there is no threat to the integrity of the justice system 
or to the administration of justice, and no grounds for disqualification.
74 In circumstances 
where the law firm fails to implement effective screening measures, it has no grounds on 
which to argue that it has been unjustly disqualified. This approach emphasises the 
protection of the former client's confidential information, but recognises that other policy 
73 See McMinn, above n 18, 1272-1273. 
74 This is the view of the majority of the court in MacDonald Estate. The New Zealand Court of A
ppeal 
in Black v Taylor indicates that damage to the administration of justice can occur even wh
en no 
confidential information passes. Although valuable for its general statement of principle ap
plicable to 
all fo1mer client conflicts, Black v Taylor is distinguishable from the situation being cons
idered 
because it dealt with a barrister who sought to represent a client against a client whom h
e had 
previously represented . It did not deal with a transferring lawyer and did not therefore con
sider some 
of the considerations important in the latter situation and not the former. 
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considerations require the law firm to be able to advance reasons why it should not be 
disqualified in the particular circumstances.
75 
A similar balancing of the different interests and policy considerations can be achieved 
under the third suggested approach. This is the approach adopted in Equiticorp Holdings 
v Hawkins. The court must determine whether the risk of the disclosure of confidential 
information is sufficient to justify disqualification of the law firm. In determining whether 
disqualification is appropriate, the court must balance this interest against the other 
considerations identified in Part VI. The court therefore balances the competing interests 
in a way that ensures that justice is done. 
Under this approach, presumptions of shared knowledge, whether rebuttable or 
irrebuttable, are rejected as unrealistic.
76 Such a position is logically sustainable, 
particularly for larger firms, because one transferring lawyer could not possibly disclose 
his or her entire knowledge of a client's affairs to all other members of the firm. However, 
the sharing of confidences is an assumption which courts have readily accepted, even 
when disqualifying lawyers who have transferred into very large firms.
77 
It is submitted that the second approach, the rebuttable presumption that confidential 
information has passed, is most appropriate in New Zealand. Former clients' confidences 
are of primary importance. Where the litigated matters are sufficiently related, these 
confidences should be presumed to be disclosed until the contrary is shown. The use of 
presumption is a powerful tool because the burden of preventing the disqualification falls 
upon the law fum once it is established that the matters are substantially related. This is 
appropriate because the law firm is best placed to negative the presumption by showing 
that confidences did not pass. A presumption based rule means that evidential difficulties 
75 Above n 4, 270 where the majority in MacDonald Estate expressly recognise this point. 
76 Penegar, above n 51, 835; SLC Ltd v Bradford Group West Inc, above n 25, 468. 
77 For example, Schiessle v Stephens, above n 23 , 421; Malle sons Stephen Jaques v KPM
G Peat 
Marwick (1990) 4 WAR 357, 371-374. 
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will not prevent the disqualification of law firms where the protection of confidential 
information is legitimately required.
78 The ultimate goal of protecting the former client's 
confidences could be thwarted if this difficulty was not addressed. 
Therefore, the solution proposed in MacDonald Estate and advocated in this paper as 
appropriate for New Zealand avoids an extreme position. Although there is a presumption 
toward disqualification, disqualification is not automatic. The court is required to consider 
whether the circumstances indicate that confidential information did not pass. If this can be 
established, no damage is caused to the integrity of the justice system by permitting the 
law firm to continue to act. Concerns over the mobility of lawyers and clients' ability to 
choose their representation have also been addressed. 
B Should Chinese Walls or Cones of Silence be Adopted in New Zealand? 
Should the existence and efficacy of a Chinese wall be a factor which the courts have 
regard to when determining whether disqualification of law firms is appropriate? Courts in 
the United States and Canada have approved correctly implemented Chinese walls as a 
method to prevent the disqualification of law firms. Despite this, New Zealand courts are 
reluctant to adopt any form of Chinese wall. 
New Zealand court's failure to adopt Chinese walls is because courts are sceptical as to 
their effectiveness. The protection that they offer has been described as "illusory".
79 Such 
concern was echoed in Equiticorp Holdings where Hemy J considered that Chinese walls 
78 The "evidential difficulties" for the former client exist because it would be difficult for t
he former 
client to be able to prove that confidences have passed. Even during discovery, the forme
r client is 
unlikely to be able to gather enough evidence to satisfy a court that confidential information
 has been 
disclosed . The new law firm is in a better position to present evidence that confidential in
formation 
has not been disclosed. The onus of proof should remain on the law firm . 
19 McNaughten v Tauranga City Council (1987) l 2 NZTPA 429, 431. Sec also Mid-Northern Fe
rtilisers 
Ltd v Connell, Lamb, Gerard & Co (unreported , 18/2/85, High Court, Auckland Registry , Thorp
 J, 
A 151/85); Kupe Group Ltd v Auckland City Council (1989) 2 PRNZ 60. 
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had little to offer in resolving conflicts of interest.
80 English and Australian judges have 
expressed similar scepticism. 
81 
However, the existence of an effective Chinese wall is one factor that a New Zealand 
court should consider in determining whether the law firm should be disqualified. The 
perceived difficulty in allowing Chinese walls is practical and not conceptual.
82 Where an 
effective and timely Chinese wall has been established, confidential information is unlikely 
to pass between lawyers inadvertently. The real concern is intentional disclosure. Chinese 
walls are ineffective where one lawyer deliberately discloses information to another.
83 The 
lawyers involved can share information in such a way that only they know of the breach of 
the Chinese wall. As Wolfram has colourfully noted:
84 
In the end there is little but the self-serving assurance of the screening-lawyer foxes that they will 
carefully guard the screened-lawyer chickens. Whether the screen is breached is virtually 
impossible to ascertain from outside the firm. 
This possibility should not deter New Zealand courts from recognising the concept of a 
Chinese wall. The court should analyse the Chinese wall put in place by the firm and 
determine whether it will be effective to prevent information disclosure. 
However a Chinese wall should not be an absolute defence to law firm disqualification. 
Other factors will be relevant to determining whether the presumption of shared 
80 Above n 45, 741 . 
81 In re A Finn of Solicitors [ 1992] 2 WLR 809, 8 I 8-819; Mallesons Stephen Jaques v KPMC Peat 
Marwick, above n 77,371. 
82 See further JR Parker "Private Sector Chinese Walls: Their Efficacy as a Method of Avoiding Imputed 
Disqualification" ( 1995) 19 J Legal Prof345, 349. 
83 Above n 4, 273 . This was the reason why Cory J did not approve the concept of a Chinese wall in 
MacDonald Estate. 
84 CW Wolfram Modern Legal Ethics (West Publishing Co, Minnesota, 1986) 402. 
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confidences can be rebutted. 
85 Where there is the suggestion of intentional disclosure, 
disqualification of the law film and disciplinary action against the lawyers involved will, 
of 
course, be appropriate. Such occurrences are likely to be rare and should not pro
vide a 
justification for rejecting Chinese walls. 
The reliance placed on a Chinese wall will depend on the court's perception of 
the 
integrity of the Chinese wall and the integrity of the parties relying upon it. In MacDonald
 
Estate, the Supreme Court required clear and convincing evidence of the wall's effi
cacy. 
There has been no analysis in New Zealand of what constitutes an effective Chinese 
wall. 86 
Reliance could be placed on successful Chinese walls established overseas. United 
States 
law firms have successfully invoked Chinese walls for a number of years. Alternative
ly, the 
extensive guidelines issued by the Canadian Bar Association on what measur
es are 
required to establish an effective Chinese wall could be relied upon. The more ext
ensive 
the protective measures adopted, the greater the chance that the film will not b
e 
disqualified. 
Given the initial hesitancy of the New Zealand courts towards the Chinese w
all 
concept, a cautious approach is justified. Although Chinese walls can nev
er be 
impenetrable, excluding the possibility that a Chinese wall can be effective would 
ignore 
the United States and Canadian experience. Chinese walls are a pragmatic solution to
 what 
has become a widespread problem when a lawyer changes employment m 
these 
jurisdictions. When the frequency of disqualification applications increases m
 New 
Zealand, law firms may seek to employ Chinese walls to prevent the sweeping effe
cts of 
85 See Part VIII . 
86 Although a Chinese wall has not been re lied upon to prevent the disqualifi cation
 of a law firm in New 
Zealand, they are relied on by banks and investment firms to prevent the di sc
losure of confidenti al 
information within one firm. In this context, Chinese walls have gained legi
slati ve recognition by 
s8(3) of the Securities Amendment Act 1988 as a defence lo insider trading .
 New Zealand Courts 
could draw on this indigenous experience lo judge what constitutes an effective 
Chinese wall. See CA 
Quinn "The Securities Amendment Acl 1988 and the Chinese wall" ( 1989) 7 Ot
ago LR 141 . 
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disqualification. In the appropriate circumstances, Chinese walls can operate to prevent 
information disclosure and should be considered by New Zealand courts. 
A similar argument applies to cones of silence. New Zealand courts have not yet 
considered whether a cone of silence can be effective to prevent the disclosure of 
confidential information to other members of the firm. The difficulty is ensuring that the 
lawyer enclosed in the cone of silence will not disclose confidential information. Despite 
this difficulty, where the court has confidence in the integrity of the lawyer involved, cones 
of silence should be adopted. To reject them out of hand is unnecessarily inflexible. 
VIII PARTICULAR FACTORS THAT NEW ZEALAND COURTS SHOULD TAKE 
INTO CONSIDERATION 
The preceding section advocates a presumption based approach to the disqualification 
of law firms. It acknowledges that Chinese walls have a useful function in the appropriate 
circumstances. In this respect, this paper adopts a position similar to that of the Canadian 
Supreme Court in MacDonald Estate. The purpose of this section is to identify and 
analyse factors, in addition to an effective Chinese wall , to which New Zealand courts 
should have regard in determining whether it is appropriate for the law fum to continue to 
act. s1 
A The Seniority of the Transferring Lawyer 
The differing levels of confidential information held by law clerks and senior lawyers, 
and the differing consequences if that information is disclosed, mean that vicariou 
disqualification decisions should take into account the seniority and experience of the 
87 See Hamcrmesh, above n 38, 265-267 for an analysis of similar factors from a United States 
perspective. 
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transferring lawyer. The more senior the lawyer, the greater the court's willingness to 
disqualify the law firm should become. 
88 
A senior lawyer in a law firm will, by virtue of his or her position, know a significant 
amount about a client's affairs. Such knowledge is not limited to the factual background 
and the specific advice being given, but includes a deeper understanding of the client's 
strengths, weaknesses and fears. This level of knowledge comes from the regular personal 
contact the senior lawyer and the client are likely to have. Because a senior lawyer is likely 
to possess such detailed information, they pose a substantial threat to their clients if they 
transfer fum and work against that client's interests. In a number of instances, precisely 
these reasons have required that the law firm be disqualified where a senior lawyer 
transfers firm. 89
 
The argument for disqualification is stronger when a senior lawyer rather than a law 
clerk transfers firm. The possibility that the law clerk possesses confidential information is 
much less. The law clerk will have less understanding of the relationship between the client 
and the fum generally and of the transactional context. It is likely that the law clerk will 
have performed only discrete tasks, such as researching specific points of law. The risk of 
the law clerk disclosing any of the former client's confidential information is relatively 
small. Therefore the court should more readily allow the law firm to continue its 
representation of its current client even though it employs a transferring law clerk. In the 
absence of any contrary indications the risk is too small to justify disqualifying the entire 
firm. 
Such a conclusion can be further supported by considering the effect disqualifying the 
law firm would have on a inexperienced lawyer's mobility. It would be an absurd result if a 
88 Bateman, above n 3, 277. 
89 Equiticorp Holdings Ltd v Hawkins, above n 45. In EZ Paintr Corp v Padco Inc, above n 24, 
the court 
held placed significant weight on the fact that the transferring lawyer was the partner in cha
rge of the 
matter and had had significant client contact. 
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law film was disqualified from continuing to represent a long standing client simply 
because it hired a law clerk who had only a peripheral knowledge of an opposing party's 
confidences. The potential risk of disqualification would not be worth the benefits that 
hiring that particular law clerk would bring to the firm. Preserving the law clerk's mobility 
should outweigh any realistic risk to the confidences of the former client. The hiring of the 
law clerk should only cause disqualification where there is a clear risk that confidences will 
be disclosed. 
B The Size of the Firm 
The size of the law firm is an important consideration in determining whether 
disqualification is appropriate. In smaller firms, consisting of only a few lawyers, the 
opportunities for inadvertent disclosure of information increase. Lawyers in such films are 
more likely to communicate on a regular basis and share access to office facilities. These 
circumstances will cause courts to be sceptical of the effectiveness of measures employed 
to combat information sharing, even where the lawyers involved swear affidavits that the 
procedures have been strictly adhered to.
90 United States courts have suggested that 
smaller firms need more impenetrable measures to prevent disqualification.
9 1 
In larger firms, the opportunities for confidential information to pass between lawyers 
are less significant. Such firms are more likely to be divided into functional departments , 
which will assist in isolating the new lawyer from lawyers acting on the protected file. 
Significant physical and functional separation of lawyers enhances the ability of the law 
90 Although in Novo Terapeutisk Laboratorium v Baxter Travenol Lab Inc, above n 20, the court pl aced 
reliance on the fact that affidavits had been sworn when ruling that di squalification was 
inappropriate. 
9 1 Nemours Foundation v Gilbane Aetna Federal Ins , above n 24, 428. The court stated: "The implicit 
assumption is that the wall, if high and thick enough, will resist an errant attorney 's lack of 
discretion , and calm public mistrust through prophylaxis. A firm of more moderate size must 
therefore erect a wall of greater impenetrability." 
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firm to prevent the tainted lawyer from communicating information to the lawyers 
currently handling the file. The presumption that lawyers share confidences has been 
considered unrealistic in the context of such a firm.
92 The size of the law firm will in part 
determine the nature and extent of the measures adopted to prevent the flow of 
confidential infonnation. 
93 
It is important to emphasise that the influence that the size of the firm will have on the 
court is a question of degree. As the law firm's size increases, there are fewer 
opportunities for inadvertent disclosure. These arguments will however not apply as 
strongly in New Zealand as they do overseas. There is significantly more scope to 
effectively isolate the transferring lawyer in the "mega-firms" that exist in the United 
States, Canada and England. Such isolation can be readily achieved because the films are 
physically larger and are often functionally separated into highly specialised areas. By 
these standards, even New Zealand's largest firms are comparatively small. This 
consideration means that New Zealand law firms should be very thorough when 
implementing measures employed to isolate a particular lawyer in order to prevent the 
disclosure of confidential info1mation. 
IX CONCLUSION 
Detennining whether to disqualify a law firm from continuing to act for a client when a 
lawyer transfers her employment involves a balancing of competing considerations. The 
appropriate balance depends on the circumstances of the case. This paper has 
demonstrated the assistance which one can gain from the consideration the issue has 
received in the United States and Canada. 
This paper has considered the various interests that are involved when a disqualification 
application is decided. After analysing the different approaches adopted by various courts, 
92 Above n 4, 269. 
93 See generally Bateman, above n 3, 279 . 
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both in New Zealand and overseas, the approach in MacDonald Estate has been 
considered the most appropriate for New Zealand. The considerations identified in Part VI 
are most appropriately reconciled by adopting a rebuttable presumption that the 
transferring lawyer has disclosed the confidences of a former client to lawyers working in 
the new firm. 
This differs from the approach of the New Zealand High Court in Equiticorp Holdings, 
which rejected the use of presumptions. It is important to emphasise that while the result 
in Equiticorp Holdings is not under question, parts of the reasoning in the judgment are. It 
is the thesis of this paper that the use of presumptions, as in MacDonald Estate, is 
preferable. 
Using Chinese walls and cones of silence to rebut this presumption should not be 
rejected out of hand. Having said this, the possible application of these mechanisms should 
be tightly circumscribed. Courts must be sure that they have been effective in preventing 
the disclosure of confidential information to other lawyers in the firm. Where this can be 
shown, law firms should be entitled to rely on the barriers they establish. It is also 
important that New Zealand courts do not ignore the seniority of the lawyer or the size of 
the transferring lawyer's new firm. Determining whether confidential information has been 
disclosed depends, in part, on these considerations. This concern, after all, is the reason 
why the disqualification of law firms is sought. 
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